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For when misfortune’s fraudful hand
Prepares to pour the vengeance of the sky,
What mortal shall her force withstand?
Aeschylus, Persians
Yet there is a grace on mortals who so nobly die.
Aeschylus, Agamemnon
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Introduction
Cassandra told them what would happen, but they did not listen. The Trojans 
perished forever, and so did she. But from the cave of her madness, amid the 
ravage of her city and a handful of helpless women — in a state of complete 
obliteration that we moderns would rush to say renders any sense of resistance 
and of meaning impossible — this is what the virgin spoke:
The Achaeans came beside Scamander’s banks, and died
day after day, though none sought to wrench their land from them
nor their own towering cities. Those the War God caught
never saw their sons again, nor were they laid to rest
decently in winding sheets by their wives’ hands, but lie
buried in alien ground; while all went wrong at home
as the widows perished, and barren couples raised and nursed
the children of others, no survivor left to tend
the tombs, and what is left there, with blood sacrificed.
For such success as this congratulate the Greeks.
No, but the shame is better left in silence, for fear
my singing voice become the voice of wretchedness.
The Trojans have that glory which is loveliest:
they died for their own country. So the bodies of all
who took the spears were carried home in loving hands,
brought, in the land of their fathers, to the embrace of earth
and buried becomingly as the rite fell due. The rest,
those Phrygians who escaped death in battle, day by day
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came home to happiness the Achaeans could not know;
their wives, their children. Then was Hector’s fate so sad?
You think so. Listen to the truth. He is dead and gone
surely, but with reputation, as a valiant man.
How could this be, except for the Achaeans’ coming?
Had they held back, none might have known how great he was.
The bride of Paris was the daughter of Zeus. Had he
not married her, fame in our house would sleep in silence still.
Though surely the wise man will forever shrink from war,
yet if war come, the hero’s death will lay a wreath
not lustreless on the city. The coward alone brings shame.
(Trojan Women lines 374–402)1
 Though it is wise to avoid war, human nature seems incapable of heeding 
this wisdom. War comes to us, as it came to the Trojans, whether we invite 
it or not, expect it or not: this catastrophic inclination that governs human 
action is tragedy of the first order. It is a universal disposition that quickly 
makes of the perpetrator victim, and vice versa. To admit this is not cynicism, 
but to deny it ignores categorically the thousands of years of history that 
have not proved otherwise. Thus, even though in this play the Greeks were 
the conquerors and the Trojans the conquered, their fates could have easily 
been reversed. If the women of Euripides’s play choose lamentation over 
castigating speeches against the enemy, it is because they somehow grasp that 
their situation is as much a general matter of human circumstance as it is the 
specific result of the Greek invasion and that had they themselves happened 
upon the fortune of the Greeks, they may have also behaved no better.2
 It is well-known that Euripides wrote this tragedy with the Peloponnesian 
War in mind. Its first performance in 415 bc marked hardly a year after the 
Melian massacre, while a short two years later the war follies of the Sicilian 
Expedition contributed to Athens’s ultimate defeat in 404 bc. There is no 
question that the line “the wise man will forever shrink from war” expresses 
what was for Euripides the ideal state of affairs. But tragedy depicts reality as 
it does ideality, and thus, the second half of Cassandra’s line is as legitimate 
as the first and deserves equal attention: when war comes and cannot be 
averted, the virtuous ones prefer the way of courage. Inspired by Dionysian 
frenzy (ἐκβακχεύουσα3), the Apollonian priestess who had to shed her priestly 
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regalia for the rags of a slave gives an impassioned defense of the “beautiful 
death,” the tragic death.
 How hubristic or naïve her statement sounds to the modern ear! A denial 
of finitude, a pointless idealization, a patriotic delirium, a false transcendence, 
an act of violence that aestheticizes death: all these are possible theoretical 
responses to this passage4 — responses that hastily flatten the poignancy of 
this speech, which Euripides deliberately reserved for the lips of the defeated 
enemy. In conflating the affirmation of fate with violent triumphalism and 
in reducing the cry for human dignity to a declaration of false mastery, such 
theorizations overlook how they themselves violate the one whom fate has 
already violated. But most of all, in deconstructing the infinitude that tragedy 
allegedly advocates, they forget that suffering, shared mortality, and loss are 
equally tragedy’s essence — albeit not without their other halves also present: 
perseverance, self-accountability, courage, and even elevation.
 Cassandra’s speech does not deny catastrophe, for the simple reason that 
such a speech could not even take place outside the scene of loss. Her words 
affirm the calamities of war but in a way that refuses the politics of self-pity 
and resentment with which the modern age has invested the predicament 
of the victim. It is because she sees the ruin all too vividly that she gener-
ously grants to her enemies their losses first, giving them the lion’s share of 
grief. Though driven by their own insolence, the Greeks suffered more, she 
says, since their dead will always remain apart from their families and their 
ancestral lands. Their corpses will never be tended lovingly by their wives but 
will remain buried in a distant country. This is not simply a rhetorical ploy to 
console her audience of captive women or provide them with some cheap 
dose of schadenfreude at the casualties suffered by the enemy. It is a fact of 
war: not to see the body, not to identify the corpse, is never to be able to do 
the work of mourning. The Greek widows and orphans will have to suffer 
interminably this fate because of this exported war. Symmetrically, to expire 
knowing they will never be seen again by their kin and will lay anonymous 
and unmourned in the land they came to conquer — this is the loveless fate 
of the Greek soldiers.
 But as she mournfully acknowledges the losses of the other side, Cassandra 
balances her words by singing of a peculiar heroism — that of the defeated. 
It is thanks to this Greek invasion that Hector was able to show his noble 
stature and become an illustrious hero. Even Hecuba’s old age and measured 
Buy the Book
xviii
INtroduction
demeanor do not stop her later from expressing a similarly strange gratitude 
for this divine destruction, which will allow Troy’s grandeur to be remembered 
in the world of song and legend:
The gods meant nothing except to make life hard for me,
and of all cities they chose Troy to hate. In vain
we sacrificed. And yet had not the very hand
of God gripped and crushed this city deep in the ground,
we should have disappeared in darkness, and not given
a theme for music, and the songs of men to come.
(Trojan Women lines 1240–45)
There is nothing insidious in Hecuba’s haunting words or in Cassandra’s song 
of glory. It is another fact of life; it describes the larger, often-inexplicable 
economy of forces that play around and against human acts. As victory comes 
at high cost, so too defeat does not preclude the human prerogative to dig-
nity, the capacity to rise to one’s circumstance despite all appearances and 
expectations to the contrary. What a feat for the Athenian playwright to put 
these words of peculiar sympathy for the conqueror, and at the same time 
of glorification for the defeated, into the mouth of the foreign enemy — a 
dispossessed, delirious, adolescent woman!
 If, as Nicole Loraux has argued, the tragic voice (phonē) spoke what the 
political speech (logos) would not admit,5 then Euripides’s Cassandra has 
usurped the confident male voice that filled the rational assembly, and made 
it resound in the opposite landscape — in the ruins of the polis, in the song 
of a maddened, enslaved girl. In doing so, she transformed it: while the polis 
declares eternal victories in order to suppress its real losses, Cassandra’s praise 
emerges out of loss. An Apollonian priestess and a Dionysian maenad at once, 
the mad prophetess has combined paean with threnody. At the end of the play, 
after her many efforts to raise her battered body from the dust and her many 
doubts regarding the value of perseverance in the face of futility, Hecuba again 
echoes Cassandra’s strength in a different register, one more appropriate to 
her advanced age and its lessons of suffering. As the voice of the coryphaeus, 
leading the women hostages into slavery, she concludes:
O
shaking, tremulous limbs,
this is the way. Forward:
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into the slave’s life.
(Trojan Women lines 1327–30)
An acceptance of what lies ahead, a sober yet unyielding determination to rise 
up, to move forward into the bleakest of futures. Not because of some hope, 
not because of a hidden plan of escape, not because of a delusion of triumph, 
but because of the impossibility of lying on the ground in self-pity any further,6 
because it is the human prerogative to assume the worst of fates in a quiet 
splendor. To accept that her slavery was an inevitable external circumstance 
without being herself a slave: this is an ontological modulation of the subtlest 
order, a distinction that sounds as theoretically risky as it is actually necessary. 
Hecuba’s last words open to a state of acceptance that is never acquiescence. 
Her minimal last utterance, her improbable decision to stand up beyond all 
exhaustion and futility: this physical and moral uprightness marks the great, 
if invisible to us, distance that separates noble resignation to one’s fate from 
surrender to humiliation.
 T. R. Henn used similar terms to describe tragic exuberance: tragedy refuses 
to reduce the human being to an agent of rationalization who merely copes 
with life’s vicissitudes and nothing more. In tragedy, Henn writes, there is 
“implicit, not only the possibility of redemption, but the spiritual assertion 
that man is splendid in his ashes, and can transcend his nature” (288). Terry 
Eagleton quotes this passage as well but takes issue with its idealism: the 
grandeur of literature belies the horror of actual war, and “it is hard to see that 
the victims of Bosnia or Cambodia are particularly splendid in their ashes” 
(28). Interested in a materialist recuperation of tragedy, Eagleton, who oth-
erwise disagrees with a host of other contemporary critics of tragedy, seems 
to agree with many of them on this cardinal point, which constitutes by now 
the staple of any ethical critique of tragedy: namely, that tragic art risks being 
a false aestheticization of real violence, just as tragic idealism may legitimize 
and excuse human suffering (28). Can we think the politics of tragedy beyond 
this elevation of suffering, which has never driven the conservatives away from 
endorsing tragic art but which has always pushed the progressives to shun 
it?7 The core of Eagleton’s project is to get around this scandalous definition 
of tragedy as the idealization of terrible faults that makes the genre sublime 
and shameless at once.
 Of course, this very worry of tragedy’s legitimization of human suffering 
bespeaks Eagleton’s own idealism — an idealism attendant to any genuine 
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Marxism — that implies that if only the philosophical (read, “idealist”) concep-
tion of tragic art stopped justifying human suffering, the latter’s occurrence 
could perhaps diminish or even vanish.8 However, what is tragic in tragedy has 
nothing to do with justification or with reason’s capacity for correction: the 
tragic flaw is ontological in its nature — not sociological or psychological — and 
it remains thus, regardless of our theoretical views of it. Nietzsche’s antirealist, 
antipolitical approach to tragedy captures this element better. Tragedy does 
not equate the spectator with the protagonist any more than it equates the 
chorus with average citizens (Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy 57–59). But in 
its hieratic remove from particular circumstances, the tragic ethos assumes its 
universal form, a form that can potentially apply to everyone by not submit-
ting to anyone’s specific realities. Not every victim of Cambodia can be like 
Hecuba, but if there is one — and tragedy grants us this certainty that there 
is always at least one — then in this fact lies tragedy’s profoundest realism and 
ethical importance.
 We may question the idealizations involved in Cassandra’s and Hecuba’s 
gestures. We may even suspect these women, since they make for unwieldy 
victims. Still, something in their example and their voice remains unshak-
able. What invests their voices with the dignity they lay claim to despite any 
objections to the contrary? What makes them into exceptions? Can we sustain 
again, afford again, hear again, the truth of that holy madness, despite all the 
claims that our modern condition is irreducibly different from the ancients? 
Or is Cassandra’s speech simply that — madness, a madness we should shrink 
from, as does Hecuba herself initially?9 But even if this is all it is, can we live 
at all without this madness?
 
In his famous remark on the nature of historical change, Karl Marx observed 
that history appears the first time as tragedy, the second as farce.10 The history 
of modern philosophy is itself a good illustration of this: Kant wrote a tragedy 
of antinomies; Hegel, Dante’s great heir, wrote the comedy by solving them. 
However, comedy quickly begat a larger tragedy — the modern tragedy (some 
may also call it tragicomedy) of being blind to the farcical nature of one’s own 
existence and viewing it, instead, as progress. Though commonly read as a 
statement on the decline of history, this Marxian phrase may also be read as a 
pronouncement on the inaccessibility of tragedy as an explicator for our time.
 In fact, since at least the famous eighteenth-century quarrel of ancients 
and moderns, the West’s self-definition in relation to the Greeks has been 
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articulated into two opposing camps: we either repeat the Greeks by imitat-
ing them (classicism, or neoclassicism, as it is also called), or we depart from 
them because our modern reality is radically different (German idealism and 
romanticism to poststructuralism).11 Though this latter camp would claim 
a more nuanced position than simply that of renouncing the Greeks, it is in 
fact structured as an inversion of its opposite: where classicism emphasized 
continuity without difference, German idealism and its legatees emphasize 
difference stripped of any essential continuities of human nature. Since the 
crowning achievement of the Greeks was considered to be their art, the dis-
pute over continuity or discontinuity was largely waged around the question 
of how modernity should receive the Greek art forms. Most importantly, 
given the scope of the present project, the debates that originated in German 
idealism (and its artistic counterpart in romanticism), which have continued 
to occupy continental philosophy and poststructuralist theory regarding the 
West’s relation to the Greeks, hinge not just on any art form but specifically 
on tragedy and its ethical vision.
 Friedrich Hölderlin, with whom this study begins and ends, invoked this 
epochal turn from the ancients to the moderns through the poetic figure 
of the caesura, a term he used to describe the balancing mechanisms of the 
Sophoclean tragic form as it distributed dramatic action over the course of 
time. He was also the one who, debunking the revivalist dreams of Johann 
Joachim Winckelmann, heralded the idea of radical discontinuity between 
ancients and moderns. His argument, brilliant in many respects, was later 
recast in one of Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditations as a critique of a type of 
historical memory that so indebts the present to its past that it paralyzes the 
present from creating anything in its own right and from engendering itself.12 
To be like the Greeks, Hölderlin said (and Nietzsche repeated) — namely, 
to be original in our own right — we have to forget about the Greeks. This 
epochal cut is the caesura that would balance out modernity’s excessive his-
torical debt, much as the early or belated entrance of Teiresias, according to 
Hölderlin, evened out the weight of the tragic action either at the beginning 
or the end of a Sophocles play, as was needed. Yet just as the entrance of the 
blind seer never happened at the same predetermined point, but according to 
the demands of the action’s distribution in each play — as the middle always 
moved toward either end — the caesura too, as a historically balancing figure, 
should never be hypostatized in one temporal direction or another. What 
is ancient and what is modern — historical weight, that is — itself shifts with 
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the passage of time; and in a simply arithmetical sense at least, modernity 
has already aged by now in calendar years, weighing the balance down on its 
side more than it cares to admit. Like Teiresias, then, the historical caesura 
must also be ready to reposition itself and to be renewed, particularly when 
it begins to settle comfortably in the guarantee of a recent renewal.
 Following Hölderlin’s lead, Friedrich Nietzsche also declared that trag-
edy was impossible in the modern world, having died with the appearance 
of Socrates in ancient Athens.13 By relying on theoretical reason, Socrates, 
according to Nietzsche, introduces for the first time thought’s delusion of 
mastery: “the unshakable faith that thought, using the thread of causality, 
can penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and that thought is capable not 
only of knowing being but even of correcting it. This sublime metaphysical 
illusion [delusion] accompanies science as an instinct and leads science again 
and again to its limits at which it must turn into art” (The Birth of Tragedy 
95–96).14 As Hölderlin did, Nietzsche sees that reflection has become our 
mode of action, our instinct, and even our art. Unlike Hölderlin, however, 
for Nietzsche there is no “tragic” without tragedy, which as a genre already 
translated what was tragic in the Greek’s life. The worldview is thus insepa-
rable from the artistic medium that expressed it. Tragedy’s eclipse was, for 
Nietzsche, a decline, the mark of a falsely optimistic culture that, lacking in 
mental strength to deal with life’s blows, relied erroneously on reason’s ability 
to parry them.15 In other words, we continue to live tragedies but without 
the means to understand them as such. This is the tragedy of what Nietzsche 
calls “Socratism,” or the age of theory — which, most tragically, does not see 
any flaws with its own certainties.
 Nietzsche’s proclamation of the death of tragedy has been echoed by a 
wide range of contemporary thinkers, many of whom lay a justifiable claim to 
his legacy. At the same time, however, they are strangely quick to bracket the 
melancholy with which Nietzsche describes the end of the tragic world, for 
melancholy is disturbingly close to nostalgia, and nostalgia is a disease that 
contemporary theory would not want to see afflict one of its forefathers.16 In 
fact, the dominant theoretical position since World War II has been almost 
diametrically opposed to Nietzsche on this point, finding that tragedy serves 
only to evoke Dionysian ghosts, ones whose mythic embrace too often justifies 
violence against the Other, and that catharsis itself risks becoming a fascist 
principle that aestheticizes pain. Tragedy, one senses, should have disap-
peared down the dark path of myth from where it took its source material to 
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begin with; myth — another word that is supposed to make everyone shud-
der nowadays, summoning, as it is said to do, the worst specters of Europe’s 
recent past, offering a primitive and violent way of understanding that has 
no place in any serious epistemology.17 Consequently, tragedy’s death has 
been viewed as a necessary — even positive — stage in its translation from an 
ancient theatrical genre to a modern philosophical idea: “the tragic.”18
 This has been particularly true of thinkers allied with poststructuralism, 
a term that functions here as a specific shorthand for the postwar textualist 
turn of French thought. Emanating out of the historicist understanding of 
truth that culminated in Hegel’s philosophy, and was further radicalized by 
Nietzsche and Heidegger (the latter two having been somewhat canonized as 
poststructuralism’s father figures), poststructuralism has impacted not only 
continental philosophy’s but also literary criticism’s receptions of antiquity 
and its ethicopolitical values. Although readers of continental philosophy have 
a more systematic understanding of this poststructuralism than that which is 
applied within literary theory, I contend that, despite this fundamental differ-
ence, the translation of Greek tragedy into the idea of the tragic has resulted in 
the elision of the tragic spirit in both the philosophical and theoretical versions 
of poststructuralism (the latter often being colloquially referred to as high 
theory).19 Having first served to usher in the climax of Western metaphysics 
in German idealism, this idea of the tragic also marks the very rift of that 
discourse — the caesura, or turn — that has led to “the beyond-the-tragic” of 
contemporary thought’s attempts to revise metaphysics and move beyond it.
 Because poststructuralism denotes a rather large and diverse field of inquiry 
that encompasses both philosophically based discourses like postmodernism 
and deconstruction and socioculturally based ones like critical theory and 
social construction theory, I should state that my concern for it in this project 
is necessarily limited to its contested relation to tragedy: in regards, that is, to 
its explicit — and more often, implicit — dismissal of tragedy as a viable mode 
of being in and understanding our world.
 On the former, philosophical side of the spectrum, two assessments of the 
end of tragedy will be most operative in this study: (1) Nietzsche’s alignment 
of tragedy’s end with modernity’s optimistic belief in the omnipotence of 
rationality, coupled with his clear preference for the lost tragic world; and 
(2) the post-Nietzschean belief that the end of tragedy is a moral and onto-
logical necessity and that even any recourse to the tragic might be ethically 
complicit with metaphysical violence. Born in the shadow of the disasters of 
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twentieth-century Europe, deconstruction and its theological offshoots locate 
an ethical danger in investing faith in the notions of subjective autonomy, pres-
ence, “full speech,” resistance, and so forth — all vital to the tragic experience, 
along with their opposites (fate and the gods, mortality and the acceptance 
of loss). Ever since, the thrust of the theoretical enterprise in the humani-
ties has been to a large extent the discovery and overturning of binaries, or 
even the neutralization of the tension whenever polarity is acknowledged — a 
neutralization that can take on various forms, of which deferral and undecid-
ability are some of the most privileged.20 Even philosophers who affirm the 
importance of the tragic do so only in its German idealist and poststructuralist 
guise — namely, not as tragedy but as the philosophy of tragedy. This translation 
has so modified the core principles of the tragic world that it has rendered 
them virtually unrecognizable, attenuating all the political force with which 
tragedy once addressed the actual nature of conflict and the importance of 
human responsibility.
 On the latter, cultural side, social construction theories (more prominent 
in the United States than Europe) and critical-theoretical models (whether 
dealing with race, gender, sexuality, colonialism, and even artistic produc-
tion and reception) often maintain the category of the subject, but only as 
a culturally constructed entity, void of any effective sense of individualized 
decision and action. In other words, social construction and cultural theory 
cannot provide adequate explanations for individual acts that transcend their 
environmental determinations and become exceptional.
 Thus, the various strains of both deconstruction and cultural criticism — often 
thought to represent opposing ends of contemporary theory — share a deter-
minist view of the human being: we are either thoroughly passive at the hands 
of necessity (“necessity” now having been renamed “alterity”) or entirely 
defined by preexisting cultural codes. Some of the questions that arise out 
of this revaluation of tragedy are: How much, in the name of originality, have 
we hypostatized the “truth” that our human condition is and will remain 
exclusively different from that of the ancients? How much, in our quest for 
originality, which is itself a Greek ideal, have we moved to the other extreme 
of the spectrum, and when would it be the proper time to reapply the caesura 
as a redirection? In other words, what if classicism and romanticism/German 
idealism are but the same Teiresias entering through two different doors 
at two different times — a cyclical repetition in history of imitation versus 
originality and vice versa? Are but a full turn like that of Euripides, whose 
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avowed modernity even in the ancient world did not stop him from bringing 
tragedy back to its most ancient cultic beginnings in The Bacchae? Further-
more, how original really is this strategy of the “unhistorical” beginning for 
modernity, when in fact it is a lesson already offered in the Greek example, as 
both Hölderlin and Nietzsche concur? Although Hölderlin and Nietzsche’s 
understanding of the original is not limited to what is chronologically new, 
but describes a leap in historical time, it is also important to remember that 
the nature of this modern leap is the same as that of its ancient occurrence; 
and this sameness should matter. Thus, of all else, it is perhaps this paradox 
of original sameness that sets modernity into a tragic temporality — a race 
whose course has already been run, yet inevitably will be run again. If this 
is the predicament of the present, then it continues to be essentially a tragic 
one, which is the reason why both these thinkers grappled with the question 
of tragedy even as they pronounced its end.
 Hence, for both classicism and romanticism, tragedy has been the site 
where certain ethical debates have been waged from the Enlightenment on. 
Questions of whether the human being is determined by outside forces (the 
divine, necessity) or by individual will (self-consciousness); of whether ethics 
proceeds from the other rather than from the self; of whether our relation 
to our historical and cultural origins is continuous or discontinuous; or of 
whether the very question of origin is itself ethically and epistemologically 
viable — all are central to Greek tragedy.
 
Tragically Speaking examines this translation that began in German idealism 
and culminates in poststructuralism, with its attendant shift from moder-
nity’s claim that tragedy is no longer possible to the more current conclusion 
that even the tragic cannot be placed beyond ethical suspicion. Though this 
translation of tragedy into the tragic and the ethical has helped continental 
philosophy articulate a nonmetaphysical type of thinking, this has not been 
without its costs. This book not only focuses on these costs but argues that 
they are themselves tragic — the site of a loss that remains unaccounted for by 
the current theoretical insistence exclusively on the gains and the originality 
of the translation.
 For instance: What happened to the political dimension of tragedy in its 
German idealist (and more recently, continental- or French-driven) transla-
tion? Does the corresponding ontologization of politics into the ethical and 
then the political not entail a certain attenuation of the real, a bracketing of 
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the actual world for the idea of the world (an idealization that, ironically, 
nonmetaphysical philosophy ascribes heavily to Plato)? How did tragedy’s 
language of contestation, which assumed agents and their actions, recede 
seamlessly into the language of singularity and alterity, which replaces the 
political subject with a theological personal impersonality?
 Indeed, of the various losses, it is the elision of politics that might prove 
the most costly, as becomes apparent in the disparagement of any notion of 
heroism in contemporary thought. Tragedy, based as it is on the necessity 
of heroic agency, offers models of resistance. To declare that tragedy is no 
longer accessible to us also marks off a certain understanding of courage, self-
presence, and will, without which any real politics is impossible. Hölderlin’s 
conclusion that tragedy-as-act (the tragic performance) is no longer possible 
produces exactly this effect: tragedy’s public, outward staging of conflict (the 
actual, the performative, the collectively experienced) becomes interiorized 
into the private, purely ethical provenance of the tragic (the speculative, the 
introspective, the singular relation to a singular Other). The resultant era of 
modern antiheroism, I believe, has led gradually to the current and profound 
distrust of resistance in most contemporary continental and cultural-theoretical 
discourses.
 Nicole Loraux’s exclusive emphasis on tragedy as a mourning song — namely, 
as a lyrical, antipolitical cry that bespeaks our universal passivity before fate 
without the attendant epic elements of human decision, responsibility, and 
agency — is a good example of this strictly antiheroic tendency. Her denial of 
any sort of agency might be the very reason why she has been so often cited 
and well received in the work of deconstructive readers of Greek thought such 
as Michael Naas. Despite my own profound indebtedness to her antipoliti-
cal interpretation of tragedy at crucial junctures of this project, I also need 
to qualify her insights by insisting that tragedy remains irreducible to either 
a simply epic (rational, deliberative, political) or a simply lyrical (mourn-
ful, irrational, antipolitical) interpretation. As a culmination of all hitherto 
practiced Greek art forms, Attic drama was both formally and thematically 
speaking a balanced synthesis of epic and lyric, Homer and Pindar, action and 
contemplation. And as if to drive further the inextricability of these oppo-
sites — to stress the coexistence of activity and passivity, will and fate — tragedy 
realigned chiasmatically the traditionally communal character of epic narration 
to an individual’s dramatic acts and the traditionally subjective character of 
lyric poetry to the communal movement of choral songs. Emphasizing one 
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pole while sidelining the other — as happens in much of poststructuralist 
theory, which consistently favors passivity and irrationality over activity and 
reason — is itself a politically symptomatic gesture, even as it carefully tries 
to distance itself from actual politics. In downplaying tragedy’s contestatory 
character, which continually involved Athens’s actual political scene no matter 
how allegorically, this modern reinterpretation severely delimits rather than 
enriches the political horizon once opened by the tragedians.
 Additionally, in pursuing how tragedy was reinscribed into the tragic, I 
focus on the tragic dimension of philosophical thinking itself, particularly 
as it insists on distancing itself from the immediacy of the tragic world, try-
ing to demythologize what it perceives to be the demonic traces of action, 
blood, contingency, and passion. While tragedy has provided indispensable 
examples for philosophy’s ethical inquiries, philosophy regards the inde-
terminable world of tragedy with suspicion — and yet keeps returning to it. 
Such returns, however, belong themselves to the tragic register: just as in 
tragedy we learn nothing from repetition but are led to repeat by necessity, 
so philosophy cannot help revisiting this space that it wishes to avoid and 
ultimately to invalidate. Accordingly, philosophy’s preoccupation with tragedy 
becomes all the more tragic when it explicitly calls for the end of tragedy, as 
has happened since German idealism, at least, and possibly even since Plato, 
though his end was configured as a banishment of an all-too-vital art form 
rather than the declaration of its demise.
 In short, despite its negative treatment by the philosophical tradition and the 
death knell sounded by even its most ardent philosophical advocates, tragedy 
has managed to maintain posthumously its privileged status in ethicopolitical 
thought. This is a rather commonly known fact. What is not discussed, how-
ever, is the too obvious paradox of this posthumous existence, this afterlife of 
tragedy — where the term “afterlife” should resonate in its field-specific sense 
of Das Nachleben der Antike (the afterlife of antiquity), the branch of classical 
studies in Germany that explored the continuing impact of ancient culture on 
modernity. What is the status of such a life outside any possibility of revival? 
Memory, quotation, and even fruitful misquotation of the dead are possible 
answers to this question. In this sense, there is certainly nothing jarring or 
paradoxical about the notion of an afterlife. In fact, nothing past is simply 
dead, though this truism too might prove a tenuous admission of infinitude 
for contemporary theory, which has staked so much of its ethics and politics 
on the notion of finitude, critiquing any hints of idealization, transcendence, 
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and infinity as variant delusions of Hegelian sublation, Christian resurrection, 
and the fascist myth of invincibility.21
 But even if we can all accept that the past still animates and is animated by 
the present, modernity’s clear and insistent verdict on tragedy’s obsoleteness 
should have removed tragedy from that list of things past that might concern 
us. How can something so ancient be of ethical importance — whether our 
ethics is theoretical or practical — after we have decided that there is an irre-
cuperable ontological rift between ancients and moderns? Such a rift may 
well entail that tragedy is a theoretically obfuscated, even nonviable, field of 
knowledge for us, since we can hardly understand its categories. Even more 
than its theoretical impenetrability, it seems that tragedy should have no 
practical pertinence in a world that claims to be no more subject to tragic 
forces and principles. Yet the critical interest in tragedy has not in the least 
subsided.22
 Given tragedy’s continuing importance alongside its repeated death sen-
tences, an almost perverse question arises: How dead is it really after all these 
blows? Or rather, to put the question more pointedly and hopefully in a more 
revealing manner, what does our modern obsession with tragedy’s death 
say about ourselves rather than about tragedy? What does it say about our 
modern wish to be spared of it? In trying to answer these latter questions, I 
bring Nietzsche’s critique of “theoretical optimism” to bear on the discursive 
practices of contemporary theory.
 I would locate some of contemporary theory’s optimism and antipathy 
to tragedy in its “democratic” worldview, which now pervades all aspects of 
existence and desires to be the overarching legislating principle behind all rela-
tions. This view is shared by both aforementioned branches of contemporary 
theory, no matter how differently each articulates its concept of democracy: a 
democracy-to-come, a liberal parliamentary democracy, a radical communi-
tarian democracy, a pluralist multiculturalist one, and so forth.23 While fully 
appreciating the ethical merits of democratic vision in the history of political 
philosophy, as well as the improvements it brought about in civic life, it is 
important to note that tragedy expresses that which exceeds civic relation.24 
It expresses the world of personal intimacy on the one hand and the clash 
of cosmic forces on the other, which admit as much suffering and injustice 
as they do joy and dreaming — events and mental states that occur within 
but point beyond the civic sphere. Thus, the community forged by tragedy 
is not so much a theoretical cipher at the verge of a messianic futurity, an 
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abstraction deferred to the end of time (which, of course, never ends!), but 
a community of perpetual consummation, destruction, and regeneration: it 
is made of the stuff of generational atonement; of intimacy and exclusion; of 
decisions between the horrible and the more horrible, which choice makes 
all the difference for understanding what remains always at stake for all of 
us in different guises. The problem, however, is that not all of us have the 
resources to rise to that understanding, and tragedy admits unapologetically 
to its incapacity to teach anyone, let alone everyone — a deeply undemocratic 
and inegalitarian admission, for which tragic literature has been consistently 
shunned by theoretical logic.
 This “democratic” impetus underlies theoretical optimism and its concomi-
tant heightened rhetoric about the end of tragedy in poststructuralist circles. 
Strangely, though, this same contemporary theoretical appeal to democracy 
is articulated in a prohibitively exclusive academic discourse, which alienates 
nonspecialist audiences, even if they are otherwise humanistically educated. 
The counterargument — that linguistic convolution is necessitated by the 
difficulty of the concepts treated — can be valid, but the abstract formulae of 
much theoretical language risks forming a bulwark against the very problems 
it claims to be addressing. Behind it the thinker retreats into an ever-greater 
self-referentiality. The dissonance between the terrible immediacy of world 
events and the safely self-referential language of the theoretical humanities 
that claims to explain them is but one of the tragicomic marks that follow the 
unproblematic reliance on the powers of theoretical reason.
 Thus, Marx and Nietzsche meet at a point where the Greeks had already 
stood: comedy is the other face of tragedy. Socrates knew this when he said 
in the Symposium (223d) that a good tragedian should also be able to write 
good comedies. Yet comedy should complement, not replace, tragedy. Hence, 
when modern thought from Hegel onward proclaims this downward spiral 
of nihilism to be yet another glorious supersession in the history of philo-
sophical progress, we have already entered a farce, one designed to distract 
from the age’s inability to deal with — let alone affirm — the tragic nature of 
the human. Nietzsche’s epochal diagnosis of theoretical optimism certainly 
does not exempt post-Nietzschean philosophy from its own untragic nihil-
ism, nor does the latter’s critique of rationality, nor even its insistence on its 
own antisystematicity. Rather, poststructuralism’s ultrarhetorical turn may be 
the very mark of a rationalistic prejudice that wishes to correct tragedy and 
ultimately dispense with it as well as of an optimism that seeks to subordinate 
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the world to the complexity of theoretical reason. Indeed, it should be noted 
parenthetically that the difference between reason and rationalism has been 
dangerously underestimated in modern thought, which collapses them into 
each other, critiquing all reason as if it were always rationalistic and as if the 
cult of the irrational would remedy rationalism’s excesses. Thus, the Greeks 
of reason and serenity were too easily revised to become a primarily Diony-
sian people (the “fiery” people of Hölderlin and Nietzsche) and were then 
disavowed in view of the excesses of Germany’s nationalist fire. However, 
since this nationalist fire has been also theorized as both apex and symptom 
of modern rationalism, reason (and with it, Apollonian balance) had to be 
disclaimed as well, most likely to our ethicopolitical detriment. That both 
these sides persist perennially in their interplay, despite our “nonmetaphysi-
cal” theorizations of them, remains tragedy’s challenge to us today. On the 
other hand, theory’s attempt to exorcise reason’s and passion’s demons at 
once often results in a rationalistic, but not necessarily reasonable or spirited, 
endeavor.
 Let me anticipate the likely objection that contemporary theory is far too 
self-reflexive about the metaphysical penchants for certainty and rational 
adequation, and these are exactly what it is trying to combat. Yet the resort 
to self-reflexivity as panacea does not necessarily heal, but often worsens, the 
wound: among other problems, self-reflexivity too often serves less a pro-
cess of fruitful meditation than it provides a cover for self-referentiality and 
self-indulgence. That uncertainty and antisystematicity are the favored new 
theoretical positions and that much contemporary theoretical prose assumes 
a creative or performative use of language (without for the most part risking 
the terrible possibility of failure that genuine creation always has in store) 
do not automatically absolve theory from the charge of weak optimism that 
inheres in discursive thought.
 This situation is not so surprising but shows the dulling effect of reflec-
tion and hyperdiscursivity; language, and theoretical language in particular, 
seems to explain away everything, particularly through the self-referential 
declarations of its own instability, incompletion, open-endedness, and so 
forth — terms that have become so well-worn as to become illegible. On the 
contrary, tragic drama demanded not to be simply read as text. Rather, it 
engaged in a thoroughgoing manner — both aporetically and cathartically — not 
only the cognitive faculties but everything else in the human body and mind. 
That theory may not see tragedy’s persistence in the modern world, however, 
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does not mean that tragedy has lost its relevance. As for us moderns, it turns 
out that our unquestionably self-confident reliance on theory shares much 
of the hubris and hamartia of the tragic genre, but regrettably not much of its 
ennobling nature. Modernity’s irreducible difference from the ancients lies 
not in the fact that tragedy is obsolete or that we inhabit a radically different 
ontological position but in the ever-more-tragic fact that we are not able to 
recognize our tragedy and call it by its name.
 Despite whatever parameters, disclaimers, and qualifications one can try 
to set when defining a large field of knowledge, as I have tried to do here with 
poststructuralism, it is impossible not to meet with the charge of generalization. 
This charge will be all the more readily launched given the critical nature of 
my overview. Thus, I am thoroughly aware of the potential objections to my 
generalized use of the term poststructuralism, as I also understand that there 
are fine points of difference between various theorists and strands of contem-
porary theory. I would not draw from the later thought of Michel Foucault in 
the second part of this book had I not respected such differences within the 
theoretical field and, even more importantly, the radical intellectual changes 
that take place within the work of a single thinker. Foucault, courageous and 
honest in admitting to the unexpected turns and outright inversions of thought’s 
journeys, composed his own palinode from poststructuralist denouncer of 
the subject in all its forms to ascetic thinker of the care of the self, provoking 
meanwhile all sorts of disputes and disappointments among friends and foes 
alike. Still, isolated variations — no matter how illustrious — do not in any way 
undermine the reality of my general claim that poststructuralist theory does 
not eschew but rather exemplifies the rationalistic optimism of modernity 
that its own father figure, Nietzsche, had denounced. After all, not all gener-
alities are necessarily untrue, and many a substantive argument would risk 
never being made out of fear that its generalization will be insensitive to its 
few exceptions.
 Interestingly, this is probably the unspoken assumption that modernity 
applies to its study of the past, even though it may not always do so sagaciously: 
“The Greeks,” said Hölderlin with a strange certainty, when he really meant 
the tragedians and more specifically Sophocles and his two plays Oedipus 
Tyrannus and Antigone. “The Greeks,” said Heidegger again, meaning only 
the best of their kind, who for him were the pre-Socratics. “The Greeks,” 
said Nietzsche too, who in his famously moody thinking devoted almost 
as much time to that intellectual nemesis he despised and admired at once, 
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Socrates, as to his idol, Aeschylus. Of other Greeks — poets, artists, legislators, 
or philosophers — continental thought and contemporary theory have little, if 
anything at all, to say. Heraclitus, Sophocles, Plato (or Socrates in his place), 
and Aristotle seem to do the work of representing the immense variety of 
philosophical and artistic currents the ancient Greek world produced.
 In acknowledging and accounting for my own generalizations, I certainly 
do not mean to reproduce modernity’s tendency to generalize about the past 
while demanding for itself a more nuanced and complex treatment. Rather, 
in foregrounding this temporal prejudice, I also wish to note that just as 
the carefully practiced generalization has its advantages, so the generalized 
fetishization of carefulness has its pitfalls. Nuance has a great value, but the 
insistence on nuance often serves intellectual safety, and by risking nothing 
else, it risks becoming a symptom of the theoretical optimism and the quietude 
of reason Nietzsche criticized. For all its avowed indebtedness to Nietzsche, 
contemporary theoretical writing shares very little of Nietzsche’s own power 
of conviction and even less of the offense he feared not mounting against his 
contemporary academic establishment.25
 
Methodologically, I am not interested in explicating specific writings on 
tragedy by various philosophers or producing a sequential chronology of 
tragedy’s reception. This kind of commentary is already rich and abundant in 
the scholarly bibliography on tragedy.26 Rather, I trace a certain genealogy of 
tragedy and the tragic, beginning with Hölderlin’s translation of tragedy into 
what became the most enduring German idealist version of the tragic and 
concluding with the implications of his vision for the contemporary philo-
sophical taboo on the tragic-heroic death. The intervening chapters examine 
the place of tragedy today by pursuing several key issues and debates that 
have developed around the contested and now-repressed terms of presence, 
selfhood, will, and heroism in modern thought, as well as try to restore to 
the Greeks their own philosophy of the tragic in Plato.
 As I have discussed, poststructuralism has radicalized the death of tragedy 
into an ethical argument in which the very idea of thinking tragedy in relation 
to our particular historical catastrophes entails a violent aestheticization and 
a corresponding diminution of the reality of these catastrophes. In contrast, 
I propose that tragedy is of the utmost ethical and political importance, in 
part because the profundity of tragic thinking lies exactly in its sustenance of 
opposition as complementarity, not as hierarchical binary in need of correction. 
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Further, I maintain that the insistence on the radical rift between ancients 
and moderns is merely another attempt to defend the boundary between 
philosophy and tragic reality, a boundary that theoretical thinking has tried 
to keep intact from ancient times onward. Put differently, the fetishization of 
this rift relies on and bespeaks the rationalist optimism that modernity has 
“progressed” to overcome tragedy’s dark archaism. Thus, despite the fact that 
many contemporary theoretical discourses view themselves as critiques of 
rationalism and progress, they share in the long-standing philosophical antipa-
thy to tragedy. They are unwittingly more Platonic than they think when it 
comes to certain moral dicta and certain attachments to discursive reasoning, 
while at the same time they share little of Plato’s formidable understanding 
of the divinely inspired, nontheoretical nature of art — an understanding that 
made of him not only a philosopher of the tragic but a tragic philosopher as 
well.
 Titled “Old Quarrels,” part 1 of this book comprises two chapters addressing 
the quarrels that have defined the modern reception of tragedy historically 
and philosophically. First comes the quarrel over the Occidental or Oriental 
nature of Greece in German idealism, which was precipitated by Hölderlin’s 
“Orientalist” interpretations of Sophoclean tragedy as well as by his obser-
vations in the “Letters to Böhlendorff ” regarding the ontological difference 
between Greeks and moderns; according to the German poet, Greek nature 
stemmed from Oriental holy pathos, whereas modern, Occidental nature 
is self-reflection. This announcement of an epochal turn lies at the source 
of poststructuralist arguments about the end of tragedy and the absolute 
discontinuity between ancients (Orientals) and moderns (Occidentals). 
In addition to arguing against Hölderlin’s historicist thesis of an ontological 
shift, this chapter also offers a critique of the still-overlooked poststructuralist 
historiographical bias that continues to ignore the issue of modern Greece’s 
virtual absence in this European heritage debate.
 The second chapter treats the quarrel between philosophy, on the one 
hand, and (tragic) poetry and art, on the other. Articulated most succinctly 
in Plato’s Republic, this quarrel resurfaced in Hegel’s modernity. I opt for a 
tragic reading of Plato by juxtaposing his expulsion of the poets with Hegel’s 
declaration of the end of art in his Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics. Whereas 
both champion the victory of philosophy over poetry, I argue that Plato’s ban 
issues from a cathartic understanding of tragedy’s powers — thus, being itself a 
poetic and tragic reaction that grants art rightfully its universal and diachronic 
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appeal — while Hegel’s pronouncement thinks of art purely in terms of a his-
torical logic, which diminishes art to being a function of timely concerns. In 
reading Plato tragically, I side with Stephen Halliwell’s thesis that Plato was 
also the first philosopher of the tragic, contrary to the German idealist legacy, 
which maintains that the Greeks had to wait for modernity to be granted a 
proper understanding of their artistic process. Moreover, by engaging some 
passing but interesting remarks on Plato by Giorgio Agamben, I contend 
that Plato’s tragic philosophical predilection is inextricably tied to his very 
suspicion of tragedy and of art in general: it was because art mattered to 
Plato that he bothered to censor it. In sharp contrast, the infinite freedom 
and formal autonomy of modern art — celebrated from Hegel to Adorno 
and beyond — misses the Platonic experience of creativity, which involves an 
ontological and political unsettling. The modern obsession with art’s freedom 
translates Plato’s high tragedy into the weaker register of theoretical reason, 
where formal autonomy is nothing but a sorry symptom of the diminished 
impact art has had in modernity. Formal autonomy is, in other words, the artist’s 
last trace of pride in a society that cares little of his or her accomplishments.
 Part 2, “For the Love of Truth,” contains three chapters that elaborate vari-
ously the connection between tragedy and the philosophical desire for truth. 
My aim in this section is threefold: firstly and most importantly, to show that 
Platonic philosophy and tragedy share a quest for truth, as Socrates follows the 
example of tragic heroes who risk everything for the telling of truth; secondly, 
to suggest that this tragic-heroic stance of truth-telling, whether performed on 
the dramatic or the Socratic stage, offers a model of political resistance; thirdly, 
to propose that of all modern and contemporary philosophical practices, it 
is genealogy — as conceived by Nietzsche and continued by Foucault — that 
most faithfully bears philosophy’s initial tragic marks, thereby also staying 
true to its most radical ethicopolitical spirit. Since my interest in the truth-
seeking function of Platonic thought and tragedy dovetails with Foucault’s later 
work, the first of these chapters is devoted to Foucault’s writings on parrhesia 
(truth-telling), which signaled his turn to Socrates and tragedy (Euripides in 
particular). Opposing deconstruction’s language games and departing from 
many of his own earlier views that enabled social construction theories to 
submit everything to cultural determination, Foucault’s treatment of parrhesia 
helps me reintroduce the philosophically and culturally contested notions 
of presence and self-relation — notions that are pivotal both to Plato and to 
tragic theater.
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 Concurring with Foucault, who reads Socrates not as a rhetorician but as a 
truth-seeker and a truth-teller, the next chapter analyzes Plato’s Phaedrus and 
Apology as dialogues that show the path to truth to be a tragic path. Although 
philosophy has viewed itself as the sole pursuer of truth, I maintain that trag-
edy is imminent in truth’s pursuit and thus always inextricable from it. Truth’s 
elusive nature along with the blindness and misunderstandings that follow its 
pursuit constitute the very core of tragedy. Tragedy is, in a strong sense, the 
search for truth gone awry. Admittedly, the notion that misunderstandings are 
unavoidable in the search for truth could be read as akin to some rhetorical 
approaches to philosophy that focus on truth’s dependence on language. At 
the same time, however, to designate these misunderstandings as tragic — as I 
do here — is obviously to diverge from such approaches that rush to celebrate 
and capitalize on the inevitable ambiguity of language. Instead of focusing on 
the axiomatic primacy of language and its rhetorical plays, I side with Plato, 
who did not consider language to be the “house of Being” but understood it 
as a human faculty that more likely obfuscates than illumines the ascent to 
truth.27
 While the structure of the Apology as tragic theater may be immediately 
apparent to the reader,28 a brief explanation of the Phaedrus’s tragic dimension 
is due. The Phaedrus illustrates the tragic movement of thinking in a twofold 
manner. Firstly, in contrasting the love of truth to the fetishization of soph-
istry, this dialogue explains and performs the very drama of philosophy as a 
search for truth. It thus anticipates the modern philosophical turn that, by 
historicizing and relativizing truth, not only produced a crisis of legitimation 
but also effected something counterintuitive to its own ethical objectives: 
although historical truth may appear less exclusive and more democratic 
than immutable truth, it is also potentially more violent and restrictive, since 
what is historical remains bound to humans, their special interests, and their 
power struggles. Historical truth cannot but also be the truth of power, of 
unjust law and brutal authority — the truth that Socrates would never grace 
by that name.
 Secondly, in questioning authority without ever assuming to be one, the 
Phaedrus itself has become as much a blind spot in contemporary thought 
as Plato’s philosophy was for many during his own time. In other words, 
it is through its own history of philosophical reception that the Phaedrus 
illustrates the tragedy of truth’s distortion. Plato directs this dialogue on 
love and inspiration against two targets: first, against the prevailing Sophistic 
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establishment, which subordinated truth to the mechanics of cold rational-
ity and rhetorical manipulation; second, against those who actually mistook 
him for a rigid rationalist and a Sophist. Ironically, then, Jacques Derrida’s 
reading of this dialogue in “Plato’s Pharmacy,” which has been celebrated 
precisely for the freshness of its rhetorical approach vis-à-vis the canonical 
insistence on the centrality of love in this text, is actually a return to the very 
establishment that Plato was speaking against. “Plato’s Pharmacy” treats this 
dialogue as an exemplar of the inherent instability and untranslatability of 
philosophical language, arguing that the multiple and mutually contradic-
tory connotations of some of its terms foreclose the possibility of any stable 
meaning even at the level of the Greek original. Nonetheless, this realization 
does not stop Derrida himself from obtaining some surprisingly stable, albeit 
“hidden,” meanings out of this dialogue — namely, that the Phaedrus relies on 
various problematic hierarchies, such as those of presence over absence and 
speech over writing. Derrida’s politics of linguistic suspicion thus uncannily 
repeats a rationalist, sophistic mode of reading that implies authority, even as 
it tries to destabilize it in others. Over and against Derrida’s line of thinking, 
I elaborate several other arguments by classicists Giovanni R. F. Ferrari and 
Seth Benardete, who focus on the speech/writing binary not so much as a 
hypostatized distinction but as an effect of Plato’s critique of the inflexibility 
of authority, whether such authority be scholarly, legal, or moral in kind. In 
pitting love against law, the Phaedrus ensconces itself in the tragic repertory, 
which rehearses this strife repeatedly and of which Antigone — the last con-
ceptual unit of this book — becomes the supreme example.
 Following the readings of these Platonic dialogues, the concluding chap-
ter of this second part turns to The Bacchae in light of Foucault’s interest in 
Euripides and parrhesia. Even though Foucault treats this tragedy cursorily, 
preferring to map the passage of parrhesia from the old inspired truth-seekers 
to Athens’s civic orators (the Sophists) in Euripides’s Ion, I maintain that The 
Bacchae gives us a more compelling — if also catastrophic — understanding of 
the ascent to truth. The play sets a fatal confrontation between two irreconcil-
able modes of truth-telling: human and divine. That the human element is 
utterly destroyed at the end of this confrontation bespeaks the tragic Socratic 
insight that human wisdom is worth little or nothing.
 Lastly, entitled “Passions,” part 3 consists of two chapters that explore the 
ethical and political importance of tragedy through the figure of Antigone, the 
tragic heroine who more than any other has inspired continental philosophy 
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from German idealism onward. While the first of these two chapters treats 
Sophocles’s Antigone and its critical rereading by Judith Butler, the final chapter, 
“Antigone’s Children,” undertakes the tragic question of the intentionality of 
one’s death, while relating it to two acts of collective self-sacrifice as a form 
of resistance in modern Greek history. Siding against Butler’s appropriation 
of the play for the purposes of social construction theories, and steering 
clear of the deconstructive ethical formula that “we are simply exposed to 
the Other,” chapter 6 maintains that Sophocles shows in the character of 
Antigone the perfect harmony between outer destiny and subjective will, 
between self-knowledge and self-accountability, between words and deeds. 
Antigone, like Socrates, is a musical character, one whose logos harmoniously 
corresponds with her bios. Furthermore, Antigone’s adherence to the unwrit-
ten law — namely, her desire to ascend to what is eternally true and not obey 
what is historically dictated and didactically written — offers a vindication of 
the Phaedrus’s truths on the tragic stage.
 That one can choose one’s death is a fundamental tragic prerogative. Yet the 
notion of death as an object of human will has been consistently attacked by 
poststructuralist theory — most notably in the thought of Maurice Blanchot 
and Emmanuel Levinas. Naturally, in an era that has killed the subject, the 
idea of death as a subject’s intention sounds simply absurd. Indeed, it could 
well be said that contemporary theory’s aversion to tragedy stems precisely 
from tragedy’s exposition of death not only as fate but also as an object of 
human intention. The book’s final chapter approaches this issue through a 
close reading of Hölderlin’s poem “Stimme des Volks,” which reflects on mass 
suicide as a mode of resistance in the ancient city of Xanthos. Subsequently, 
I forge a link between this tragic notion of the intentionality of one’s death 
and two modern acts of communal resistance in the nineteenth-century 
Greek struggle for independence: the 1803 collective suicides of the women 
of Zalongos in Epirus and the 1866 explosion of the Arkadi Monastery in Crete 
by its besieged inhabitants. Both acts repeat in modernity the Antigonian 
lineage (and tragic lineage more generally) of self-destruction in the face of 
the intolerable. The dark circumstances under which these people were called 
to make a decision in common and to undertake an action so unthinkable to 
the comfort of theoretical contemplation emphasize the nature of tragedy as 
action and political experience (drama, deriving from dran, means “to act”29) 
rather than as text subject to individual ethical reading.
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With no Anglo-American disciplinary equivalent to the cumbersome German 
Das Nachleben der Antike, this book has to be situated somewhat awkwardly 
in a transitional space — something we may call the relation of ancients and 
moderns. The difficulty of assigning it clear academic borders might well 
be because my own concerns with tragedy have for a long time exceeded 
the category of academic interest, forming instead a crucial endpoint in an 
autobiographical story.
 Having studied the classics in the earlier part of my education in Greece, I 
was compelled already then by the vision of the tragedians, which I later sought 
to rediscover in the modern European lyric’s preoccupations with catastrophe. 
The step to poststructuralism came naturally, as did the step back to German 
idealism and romanticism that brought me full circle: tragedy, again. As my 
excursion into German idealism incited my interests in the Greeks more than 
in the moderns and as my research into the Greeks intensified, I encountered 
a fundamental impasse with many of the ethicopolitical inversions, assump-
tions, and neutralizations that contemporary thought has helped canonize 
in the humanities over the recent decades: the fetishization of absence over 
presence, and writing over speech; the insistence on the authority of the text 
over the authenticity of an act; the concomitant evaporation of the political 
into the ethical; the false certainty that the theorist’s self-reflexive retreat is the 
only legitimate response to the call of thinking. All these premises can only 
be possible if one first ends the tragic worldview, which would run counter 
to and upset all of them.
 Tragedy as a “grave act” requires presence, speech, self-relation, and self-
accountability; these modes of self-presentation involve a public dimension 
and are all necessary if our acts are to be thought of not only as responses to 
the singular, theologized Other of contemporary ethics but to the many others 
of actual political contestation. Furthermore, even my ethical obligation to 
the Other does not simply proceed from that Other, to whom it nonetheless 
remains always directed. It proceeds first and foremost from my relation to 
myself, from my presence to myself. Surely, the Other, Necessity, Fate, and the 
gods taunt me; they require me to respond. But how I respond — my ethical 
choice, that is — has very little to do with them and all to do with me. Even 
to recognize that there is another in front of me and even to grasp that I am 
obliged to respond to this alterity require me to have a prior ethical relation to 
myself. This priority holds true even if one assumes the modern notion that 
the self is itself split and thus always other to itself — namely, if one accepts 
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Hegelian alienation as the mark of Spirit, as the process of self-objectification 
through which the human being attains self-consciousness, differentiating 
itself from the rest of the natural world; for such a division is still generated 
from within the self. It is the self who first divides itself (hence, self-division, 
self-split) and, in this capacity, shows itself to be unlike the other creatures 
who, despite encountering members of their kind, can never effect the same 
movement of otherness within themselves. Hegel’s awareness of this ontologi-
cal priority is shown in the fact that he returned the alienated aspect back to 
the self — a recuperation poststructuralist critiques have found totalizing and 
oppressive to the nonidentical.
 Can I live with myself if I do such and such? This is the question from 
where all responsibility begins. This is why even though Antigone and Ismene 
share very similar sociocultural environments (they are of the same family 
and social standing and have been raised with the same moral values) and 
even though they are both confronted by the same Other (the corpse of 
Polyneices), they act in radically different ways, because each has a different 
relation to herself and to her own limits. Can I live with myself — that is, can 
I be present to myself in my decision? This is the essential question that the 
profoundly moral being, however, hardly ever needs to ask; in other words, 
it hardly needs to other itself before answering it. Recall that Antigone never 
poses it, as she never divides herself before deciding. Her decision is immedi-
ate: she would have always buried that brother, no questions asked. Thus, to 
extrapolate from this rather heuristic question a process of self-objectification 
that amounts to an absolute split and an irreducible otherness of the human 
being from itself is at best a theoretical overstatement. Tragedy, in contrast, 
understands that self and other, presence and decision, necessity and freedom 
pose for us real and worldly problems that require philosophical agon and 
urgent answers, not linguistic games and hyperbolic constructs that make the 
world appear and disappear with a sleight of hand. Hence, my title, Tragically 
Speaking, emphasizes exactly this importance of speech as self-presence and 
responsibility (as in tragic theater) for any effective criticism of the rational-
izing and solipsistic impulses of the theoretical endeavor.
 It goes without saying that such a project of trying to engage what has 
repetitively been deemed as irrecuperable must face realistically not only its 
limits but its very “impossibility,” as the contemporary theoretical vocabulary 
would say. It is not hard to see that the impossibility of writing tragedy in 
the modern world can extend equally to the impossibility of writing about 
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tragedy. To begin to write on tragedy may itself now belong to the sphere of 
farce. Yet like many others, I too have found the call of tragedy so irresistible 
as to risk this repetition. Tragically Speaking is the speaking of this repetition; 
and in many ways, this is a book about repetition. It is also, however, a book 
written from a certain theoretical dislocation, a being-out-of-step with one’s 
time, affirming something that has actually been made a moral taboo in the 
modern world, the more it is given lip service in political speeches and popular 
opinion alike: freedom. By no means do I refer to this commodity that the 
West has been exporting violently everywhere in its “free markets” — this ugly 
economic and supposedly democratic correlative of the philosophical egoism 
of free will. Rather, I remain captivated by another kind of freedom — invisible, 
unnameable, and even censored in the present language of perfect submission, 
but not necessarily inexistent.
 Tragedy has been the stage where I have encountered it at its subtlest but 
most enduring form, for tragedy shows freedom neither as licentious play nor 
as the sure success of the all-mastering, rational human will. Tragic freedom, 
always in tension with the overwhelming order of things, comes not as a 
cheap reward but as a constant responsibility most likely accompanied by 
loss. It appears never as an optional choice but as an ineluctable necessity: 
one simply has to. The question is what one does with this “has to.” Though 
external circumstance may more often than not repeat itself, tragedy illumi-
nates the subtle differences in each individual’s response to life’s unalterable 
predicament. William McCollom writes, “Choice is at the heart of tragedy. 
Any philosophy which denies the reality of the self or of its activity, includ-
ing its choices, destroys at the same time a necessary basis of tragedy” (4). 
This book is concerned with such theoretical efforts, both deliberate and 
unwitting, to efface the necessity of tragedy (and thus of freedom) and to 
do so ostensibly in the service of an ethical agenda: unfastening ethics from 
its traditionally individualist and allegedly violent entanglements with the 
categories of the self and choice. Needless to say, the theoretical imperative 
behind this revaluation assumes a particular notion of the self as always being 
selfish and of choice as always meaning control — notions that could not be 
further from the tragic universe. In so destabilizing subjectivity qua selfhood, 
this new ethics inadvertently destabilizes the field of responsibility as well: 
if there is no choice, there is also no consequence. Human meaninglessness 
is affirmed no more with tragic regret but with a nonchalance that can only 
be afforded by theoretical distance.
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 Thus, this book is also a departure from the lessons learned of my own 
theoretical education, into a territory yet uncharted — one that cannot be 
mapped within the Occidental (the European or American) theoretical per-
spective any more than it can be restricted within the Oriental parameters 
Hölderlin and others rushed to ascribe to it. This ancient terrain beckons 
us but remains strange as well — something of a historical enigma, the site 
of a peculiar harmony and a terrible contestation at once: the harmony and 
contestation between absolute and contingent, infinite and finite, God and 
mortal, blood and word, fate and freedom, Orient and Occident, philosophy 
and art. In relation to this balanced strife and the striving toward balance, let 
us recall H. D. F. Kitto’s understanding of the function of the golden mean 
in Greek culture:
The doctrine of the Mean is characteristically Greek, but it should not tempt 
us to think that the Greek was one who was hardly aware of the passions, a 
safe, anaesthetic, middle-of-the-road man. On the contrary, he valued the 
Mean so highly because he was prone to the extremes. . . . He sought control 
and balance because he needed them; he knew the extremes only too well. 
When he spoke of the Mean, the thought of the tuned string was never far 
from his mind. The Mean did not imply the absence of tension and lack of 
passion, but the correct tension which gives out the true and clear note. (252)
 Greek balance is not anodyne any more than the extremes it tries to bridge 
obey a neat hierarchy: the opposing extremes are both equally important, 
just as the balance and strife that alternately regulate them are themselves 
equally important. It is from these fragile but miraculously held complemen-
tarities — and not from hierarchical binaries — that tragedy sprang, and it is to 
the perpetual recalibration of these opposing forces that tragic experience 
always points. Tragedy speaks these oppositions despite all philosophical 
attempts to silence it, and it has spoken them in different languages and dif-
ferent forms, though its exclusive expression remains Attic drama: it speaks 
them in the decisions of individuals and groups to resist in the face of total 
annihilation, in acts of love and sacrifice, but also in the fury of revenge, the 
fit of jealousy, and the plight of any exile to find a land to die. It speaks them 
despite the fact that official thought may deem these experiences inadmis-
sible for being too “empirically” contingent, too “anthropological,” and not 
sufficiently philosophical, thus calling into question their symbolic efficacy 
and even their historical legitimacy.
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 True enough, repetition is not only sameness but difference as well: noth-
ing recurs exactly the same way. Time takes care of that, and we do not step in 
the same river twice. However, difference does not eliminate the persistence 
of that something that keeps reappearing, returning, piercing through. The 
question of the tragic has been one of these around which modernity has criti-
cally returned to define itself in its difference from the ancients. Indeed, as I 
have already outlined, tragedy has offered the locus of more than a linguistic 
or cultural translation: it has been interpreted as the translation of ontologi-
cal dispositions, of what it means to be a modern versus a Greek. But if the 
discourse on tragedy proves itself to be a site of repetition, it is most likely 
because tragedy’s own structure admits first and foremost to repetition. By 
speaking the unavoidable, tragedy opens to eternal returns, for mortals can-
not conquer the unavoidable even as they are always driven to confront it. 
Tragedy is the inevitability of its own repetition. To say or to think otherwise 
would be farce.
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